Determining the Optimal Carbon Tax Rate based on Data Envelopment Analysis by Jin, Minyue et al.
Accepted Manuscript
Determining the Optimal Carbon Tax Rate based on Data Envelopment Analysis
Minyue Jin, Xiao Shi, Ali Emrouznejad, Feng Yang
PII: S0959-6526(17)32427-7
DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.10.127
Reference: JCLP 10919
To appear in: Journal of Cleaner Production
Received Date: 01 November 2016
Revised Date: 01 September 2017
Accepted Date: 11 October 2017
Please cite this article as: Minyue Jin, Xiao Shi, Ali Emrouznejad, Feng Yang, Determining the 
Optimal Carbon Tax Rate based on Data Envelopment Analysis,  Journal of Cleaner Production
(2017), doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.10.127
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to 
our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo 
copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. 
Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the 
content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
1
Determining the Optimal Carbon Tax Rate based on Data 
Envelopment Analysis
Minyue Jin1, Xiao Shi2*, Ali Emrouznejad3*, Feng Yang1
Abstract
Carbon tax policy is widely used to control greenhouse gases and how to 
determine a suitable carbon tax rate is very important for policy makers considering 
the trade-off between environmental protection and economic development. In an 
industry regulated by carbon tax policy, we consider two competing firms who sell 
ordinary products and green products respectively. In order to promote the firm who 
sells ordinary product to reduce carbon emissions, the government of China imposes 
carbon tax on the ordinary products. For the government, three objectives are 
considered when it makes carbon tax policy. They are increasing the government 
revenue, reducing the government expenditure and decreasing the carbon emissions. 
For the firms, it is important to explore their pricing strategies taken into account of 
the government tax policy. To find an optimal carbon tax rate and to achieve the three 
objectives simultaneously, we consider this as a multiple criteria decision-making 
problem. Hence, we propose to use a centralized data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
approach to solve it. We find that when one firm produces ordinary products and the 
other produces green products, the government may set a high tax rate. While when 
both firms sell ordinary products, the optimal tax policy for each firm is different and 
the government may impose a higher tax rate for one firm and a lower tax rate for the 
other firm. 
Keywords: Carbon tax policy; government revenue; government expenditure; carbon 
emissions; centralized DEA approach 
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1. Introduction
The recognition of the climate change effected by greenhouse gases (GHG) has 
received a large amount of attention over the last several years (Lee 2011, Al-Mulali 
and Sab 2012, Wang et al. 2013). The first treaty aims at reducing carbon emissions, 
i.e., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), entered 
into force in 1994. Then the Kyoto Protocol extends the 1994 UNFCCC and asks 
different countries to fulfill their obligations of GHG emissions limitations (Grubb 
2004). From the perspective of firms, it is also widely accepted that environmental 
issues such as carbon emissions will have bad impacts on shareholders’ value 
(McKinsey&Company 2010). Thus, a large number of firms and companies are 
participating actively in emission reduction activities. For instance, Tesla Motors aims 
at eventually offering zero emission electric cars at prices affordable to average 
consumers. As another example consider Hewlett Packard (HP), HP focuses on 
materials innovation, includes reducing each product carbon emissions during 
manufacturing stage and usage stage (Raz et al. 2013). However, for most firms, 
manufacturing low-emissions products may need advanced technology and require 
substantial up front investments, for example, Tesla invests a large amount of money 
in battery technology. This, on the other hand, makes firms afraid to move toward 
environmentally friendly technology. Therefore, it is important and necessary for the 
governments and organizations to implement regulations and laws to motivate firms 
to adopt green technology and produce low-carbon products.
The taxation approach is widely used among regulators to achieve environmental 
benefits (Felder and Schleiniger 2002, Lin and Li, 2011). A significant tax policy can 
induce the firms to adopt pollution abatement technologies and produce 
environmentally friendly products (Avi-Yonah and Uhlmann 2009). For example, in 
1990, the US government imposes upon tax on chlorofluoro carbons (CFCs). Because 
the tax is much higher than the cost of CFCs, some new technologies are used to 
improve the utility ratio of one unit of CFCs and the consumption of CFCs had 
dropped by over 70% in the next 5 years (Krass et al. 2013). Tax policy is perceived 
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as a useful tool to reduce carbon emissions. However, it may hurt firms’ profit 
because of its enforcement. Therefore, when policy makers make taxation decisions, 
they have to consider the effect of the tax policy from multiple aspects, like 
environment impact, firms’ profit and government expenditure (Mankiw et al. 2009). 
Therefore, our first research question is how the government should make carbon tax 
policy considering multiple objectives.  
In practice, a large number of consumers are showing interests in green products. 
According to a survey made by the Gallup Organization in 20091, 83% of the 
Europeans express their willingness to buy an eco-safe product. Bei and Simpson 
(1995) indicate that in addition to the utility obtained directly from a purchased 
product, green consumers can receive psychological benefits from buying 
environmentally friendly products. Bansal (2008) study the design of regulatory 
instruments under the assumption that the consumers are willing to pay extra for 
buying green products. Based on these research, our second research question 
explores how the firms make pricing decisions if the consumers are sensitive to the 
carbon emissions. 
In this paper, we discuss the policy decision of the government on how to 
determine the optimal tax rate considering the firms’ pricing strategies. The objectives 
of the government include three goals, increasing the government revenue, reducing 
the government expenditure and decreasing the carbon emissions. As it can be shown 
later in this paper, these three objectives are conflicting because increasing the carbon 
tax rate may leads to lower carbon emissions but higher government expenditure. 
Therefore there is trade-off between the three goals. To select the best tax policy, we 
regard the problem as a multi-criteria decision-making problem and use centralized 
DEA approach to solve it. 
From the numerical example, we find that when there is one firm selling ordinary 
products and the other selling green products in the market, the government may set a 
highest tax rate. We find that when one firm produces ordinary products and the other 
1http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_256_en.pdf
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produces green products, the government may set a high tax rate. While when both 
firms sell ordinary products, the optimal tax policy for each firm is different and the 
government may impose a higher tax rate for one firm and a lower tax rate for the 
other firm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review relevant literature in 
Section 2. In Section 3, we describe our model setup and introduce the centralized 
DEA approach. We analyze the benchmark model with one firm selling ordinary 
product and the other selling green product in Section 4. We study the firms’ pricing 
strategies and government carbon tax policies for both firms in Section 5. Section 6 
offers conclusions and discussions of extensions for future research.
2. Literature review
Our work contributes to the operations management literature that study 
environmental policy (Zhang and Xu 2013, Qiu et al. 2017, Sabzevar et al. 2017). For 
example, Drake et al. (2015) study the impact of emission tax on a company’s long-
run technology choice and show that in certain conditions an increase in tax rate 
would decrease investment in clean technology. Krass et al. (2013) investigate how to 
use environmental taxes to motivate firms to adopt greener technologies and they find 
that over increase in taxes may have a negative impact on the firms’ technology 
choice strategies. Manikas and Kroes (2015) present a new forward buying method to 
reduce the impact of emissions allowance acquisitions on firms’ financial 
performance. From the perspective of supply chain cooperation, Ji et al. (2017) 
compare three different modes of carbon allowance allocation rules and show that cap 
and trade regulation based on benchmarking mechanism can more effectively push 
manufacturers to produce low-carbon products. And it would be more beneficial to 
the retailer to cooperate with the manufacturer with lower emission reduction cost. 
Zakeri et al. (2015) examine the supply chain performance at the operational planning 
level under the carbon taxes policy and show that carbon trading mechanisms leads to 
better supply chain performance in terms of emissions and cost. Park et al. (2015) 
study how carbon penalty changes the supply chain structure and social welfare. 
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Additional, Liu et al. (2015) focus on the impact of carbon emission regulation on 
firms’ remanufacturing strategies and Wang et al. (2015) study how carbon taxes 
affect the selection of transportation modes and social welfare. While in these papers, 
they assume that the government has single goal, i.e. maximize social welfare or 
minimize the total pollution. In our paper, we consider multidimensional missions of 
the government, which include increasing the government revenue, decreasing the 
government expenditure and reducing carbon emissions, and centralized DEA 
approach to find out the best carbon tax policy. 
A number of studies examine environmental efficiency evaluation based on DEA 
method (Bian and Yang 2010, Wang et al. 2013, Han et al. 2015). Xie et al. (2014) 
investigate the environmental efficiencies of electric power industries in 26 OECD 
from 1996 to 2010 and find that fuel structure change and economic situation and 
energy prices are main driving forces that affect environmental total factor 
productivity. Song et al. (2014) consider the internal structure of production system 
and propose a two-stage DEA approach to evaluate the environmental efficiency of 
China. Furthermore, Wu et al. (2016) combines individual interest preference with 
efficiency evaluation to reflect the current environmental situation in China. Chen and 
Jia (2017) introduce big data theory to select input and output data of different region 
and apply Slack-based measure model to evaluate the environmental efficiencies of 
China's industry. 
Recently, Lozano et al. (2004), Lozano et al. (2011), and Yu et al. (2013) utilize 
centralized DEA models to deal with centralized resource allocation problems. In 
these models, the objective of the centralized decision-makers is to maximize the 
overall output production by all DMUs or optimize the combined resource 
consumption of all units, rather than considering them separately (Feng 2013, Yu et 
al. 2013). To evaluate the environmental efficiency from the overall view, centralized 
DEA approach is also applied to model undesirable variables, e.g., carbon emissions 
(Zhou et al. 2014, Sun et al. 2015). 
Much different from the literature above, in this paper, we focus on how to 
choose a best carbon tax policy for the government considering the firms’ carbon 
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reduction activities and the government multiple goals. In order to solve the problem, 
we use backward induction combined with centralized DEA approach to select the 
optimal carbon tax rate. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use 
centralized DEA method to consider multidimensional problems of the government 
along with pricing decisions of the firms. 
3. Model set-up and assumptions
We consider two competing firms in the market ( ), each of which sells a 1,2i 
kind of product. The products can be differentiated by the selling prices, production 
costs and carbon emissions per unit. Except these, the two products are of no 
difference. There is a local government in the market. In order to promote the firms to 
reduce carbon emissions, the government decides to impose a carbon tax on the 
products which exceeds the green standard. Next, we present the decisions of each 
players and the sequence of the event. Notations are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 Summary of Notations 
Symbol Definition
ei Carbon emissions of PROi per unit 
ci Production cost of PROi per unit 
pi Selling price of PROi per unit 
  The turnover tax imposed by the government for each unit of product
 it The carbon tax rate for PROi 
 i The government expenditure for each unit of PROi
3. 1 Firms
There are two competing firms F1 and F2 in the market. The subscript 1 
represents F1 and the subscript 2 represents F2. The products are denoted by PRO1 and 
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PRO2. We assume that each consumer buys at most one unit of either PRO1 or PRO2. 
The net utility of a consumer can be stated as follows (Bi et al. 2016):
(1)U = ui ei  pi , i=1, 2
Where ui (i=1, 2) is the consumer’s potential utility in possessing a product if ei=0 and 
pi=0 and is large enough to guarantee non-empty market coverage. In other words, 
one consumer can choose to buy a PRO1 or a PRO2, and he cannot choose to buy 
nothing. Without loss of generality we normalize that ,  (i=1,2) is the 1 2u u u  ie
amount of carbon emissions per unit of product and we assume .  is the 1 2e e
sensitivity coefficient of a particular consumer to the carbon emissions and is assumed 
to be uniformly distributed on . Obviously a higher  implies that the consumer [ , ] 
prefers products with lower carbon emissions better. pi (i=1,2) is the selling prices of 
product i. By calculating the utility function, we obtain that consumers with 
 would buy PRO1, while consumers with  would buy PRO2, *[0, ]  *[ ,1] 
where .* 2 1 1 2( ) ( )p p e e   
Environmental tax is an effective way to help reducing products’ carbon 
emissions (Krass et al. 2013). It is intuitively believed that the reduction of carbon 
emissions has a positive correlation with government carbon tax. Therefore, we use 
 to represent the impact of carbon tax on the firm’s emissions ii i
i
te e e
k

   
reduction of PROi per unit. Here,  is the elasticity parameter of carbon tax and 1 
. In other words, decreasing the emissions becomes increasingly necessary with the 
augment of the carbon tax.  denotes the correlation coefficient between the carbon ik
emissions and tax rate. Higher  means that the government carbon tax has a greater ik
impact on the firm’s emissions reduction activities. If , then . That ik   ie e
means the carbon emissions of PROi is very close to the green standard. We abandon 
the situation of  because the carbon emissions of a regular product per unit 0ik 
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would always be a definite value and could not be . In order to make it easier to 
calculate, we let  and then  can be written as .1/ ik k i
i
te
k

  i ie kt  
3. 2 Government
In practice, many indications impact the government decision of tax rate. In this 
paper, we consider three objectives, i.e., government revenue, government 
expenditure and carbon emissions. The definitions of the three objectives are given as 
follows.
Government revenue
Government revenue refers to the revenue of the government finance from its 
imposition of a tax, a fee or any other charge. Taxation is the main source of 
government revenue and can help to stabilize the economy and promote desirable 
behavior. Therefore it is necessary for policy makers to consider the government 
revenue when they implement a carbon tax policy. The government revenue is 
calculated by the following equation
(2) * * * *1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )R p c p c t e e t e e                    
In Equation (2), the first two terms are turnover tax from PROi, the second two 
terms are carbon tax of PROi.
Government expenditure 
The government expenditure includes the cost that the government pays for 
supervising the production process of each unit of product, like personnel, information 
technology and telecommunications (Chen 2001). For different types of the products, 
the spending may be different. We assume that government spending of PRO1 per unit 
is 1 and that of PRO2 per unit is 2. Based upon this, we identify government 
expenditure as follows
(3)E=( *  )1  (  *)2
The total government expenditure consists of two parts, i.e., the spending generated 
from PRO1 and the spending generated from PRO2.
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Carbon emissions
Carbon emission, particular CO2, is the major factor that causes potentially 
irreversible changes in global climate. Therefore, we use carbon emissions as the third 
indicator for the government to implement the tax policy. The total carbon emission is 
expressed as
(4)* *1 2( ) +( )Q e e     
Where the first term is the total carbon emissions of PRO1 and the second term is the 
total carbon emissions of PRO2.
The sequence of the events can be described as follows: First, the local 
government determines the tax policy for each firm. Upon seeing the tax policy, the 
two firms, simultaneously, choose their product selling prices pi. We use backward 
induction to characterize the problem. In the first step we present the firms pricing 
decisions given the government tax rates, while in the second step, we offer a bundle 
of feasible carbon tax rates, and use centralized DEA approach to select the 
government optimal tax rates proposed to each firm. 
3. 3 Method
Suppose there are a bundle of n feasible choices, denoted by t1, t2, …, tn. The 
corresponding government revenue, government expenditure and carbon emission for 
ti are Ri, Ei and Qi respectively. In the decision making process, the government aims 
to increase the revenue and decrease the government expenditure and carbon 
emissions. Then to determine the optimal tax rate becomes a multiple criteria 
decision-making problem, which is to rank or select from a set of alternative courses 
of action in the presence of conflicting criteria. Correspondingly in our problem, the 
government revenue R is positive criteria while the government expenditure E and 
carbon emissions Q are negative ones. Next, we give the method for the government 
on selection of best carbon tax policy based on centralized DEA approach.
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3. 3. 1 Environmental DEA Technology
The joint production of desirable and undesirable outputs can be described as 
“environmental production technology”. It depicts the process of converting input 
vectors (E) to desirable output vectors (R) and undesirable output vectors (Q) (Fare et 
al. 1989). The production technology set (T) is assumed to satisfy the following 
assumptions:
(1) If  and , then (weak disposability for ( , , )E R Q T 0 1  ( , , )x E Q T  
desirable and undesirable outputs).
(2) If  and , then (null-jointness of desirable and ( , , )E R Q T 0Q  0R 
undesirable outputs).
The conceptual definition of environmental production technology can be 
approximated by piecewise linear combinations of the observed data, which is similar 
theoretically to DEA form; as such, it can also be called “environmental DEA 
technology”. Under CRS assumption, environmental production technology T can be 
approximately formulated as follows: 
(5)
 
1
1
1
, , : , 1,...,
, 1,...,
, 1,...,
0, 1,...,
n
j ij i
j
n
j rj r
jW
n
j dj d
j
j
E R Q E E i m
R R r s
T
Q Q d D
j n







                



The formulation of Shephard environment DEA technology is as follows:
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(6)
 
1
1
1
1
, , : , 1,...,
, 1,...,
, 1,...,
0 1, 1
0, 1,...,
n
j ij i
j
n
j rj r
j
n
S j dj d
j
n
j
j
j
E R Q E E i m
R R r s
T Q Q d D
j n

 
 
 





                        




Where  is the abatement factor, which ensures that  satisfies the above two  sT
assumptions. The second and third constraints in Model (6) are non-linear, which they 
can be transformed to linear form by defining a new variable  to replace the ˆ j j 
old variables. The converted model can be expressed as follow:
(7)
 
  




































iji
j
n
1j
j
n
1j
ddjj
n
1j
rrjj
n
1j
iijj
S
EminE
n,...,1j,0ˆ
ˆ,10
D,...,1d,QQˆ
s,...,1r,RRˆ
m,...,1i,EEˆ:Q,R,E
T





It is worth noting that the reason to add constrain  is to prevent the  mini ijE E
condition  (which cause ), than any activity  will be feasible (This 0  ˆ 0j   0,0,E
is because according to the first constraint in Model (3), input vectors E cannot be 
smaller than the observed practical value). 
3. 3. 2 Centralized Model for Environmental DEA Technology
Based on environmental DEA technology, the centralized models (6) and (7) are 
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employed in order to make sure that all firms act in a way which optimize the 
performance for the government as a whole. After centralized optimization, all DMU 
activities are as efficient as possible under the potential desirable outputs and 
allocated undesirable outputs set by the model. Then, the centralized DEA model 
(Lozano and Villa, 2005; Yu et al. 2013) can be formulated as follows:
 (8)
 
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
. . , 1,...,
\, 1,...,
, 1,...,
0 1, 1
0, 1,..., , 1,...
min
n n n
jr ij ir
r j r
n n n
jr tj tr
r j r
n n n
jr dj dr
r j r
n
jr
j
jr
i ij
Min
s t E E i m
R R r s
Q Q d D
j n r n
E E

 


 

  
  
  

 
 
 
  
  

 
 
  

This is a linear optimization model with  variables. By solving this 1nn2 
model above, the efficiency of each DMU can be obtained.
In section 4, we first explain a benchmark model considering the situation where 
there is only one firm that produce ordinary products with carbon emissions exceed 
the green standard. We then extended this, in section 5, to the case where the 
government imposes carbon taxes on both firms. 
4. Benchmark model: tax policy on one firm
In this section, we assume that there is only one firm in the market whose carbon 
emissions of its product exceed the green standard. In other words, the other firm that 
produce green product do not need to pay for carbon tax. Next, we derive the pricing 
strategies of the two competing firms and give government optimal carbon tax policy 
considering the government three goals.
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4.1 The pricing decisions of the two firms
As can be seen above, the demand of the ordinary product PRO1 is  and * 
demand of the green product PRO2 is . Then, F1’s optimization problem is   
given by
(10)
1 2
1 1 1 1 2,
max   =( )( )(1 ) ( )( )
p p
p c t e e           
Where c1 is F1’s variable cost per unit of product and p1 is the selling price.  is the 
turnover tax rate for each product that sells out. The first term represents the net sale 
profit and the second term represents the government carbon tax.
The profit of F2 can be written as follows:
(11)
1 2
2 2 2,
max ( )( )(1 )
p p
p c      
Where c2 is F2’s variable cost per unit of product and p2 is the selling price. The 
products that F2 manufactures can meet the green standard. Therefore it does not need 
to pay carbon taxes.
To find the optimal p1 and p2 to maximize  and , we 1 1 2( , )p p 2 1 2( , )p p
differentiate  with respect to  and with respect to , which yield the 1 1( )p 1p 2 2( )p 2p
first-order conditions:
(12)1 11 2 1 1 1
1
=( ( ) )(1 ) ( )(1 )k t p p k t p c t
p
            
(13)1 12 1 2 2 2
2
=( + ( ))(1 ) ( )(1 )k t p p k t p c
p
          
Since it can be verified that the two functions are convex in p1 and p2 
respectively, the optimal p1 and p2 can be obtained by forcing and1 1 0p  
. Then we have2 2 0p  
(14)
+1
1 1 2
1 2( )= ( 2 2 )
3 1
ktp t k t k t c c

   

     
(15)
1
2 1 2
1( )= (2 2 )
3 1
ktp t k t k t c c

   
 
     
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4.2 Determining the optimal tax policy based on centralized DEA
In this section we use a numerical example to illustrate our method. Some 
parameters are given in Table 2.
Table 2. Parameters setting in the numerical example
c1=1 c2=3 e2=10 =0.1
= 0 1  k=1.5 α=1.5
1=4 2=3
We let tax rate t to be 0.4, 0.55, …,6.25 with common difference of 0.15, and 
thus 40 feasible choices on the tax rate are obtained, as shown in the first column of 
Table 3.
According to Equations (2)-(4), all values of the government revenue, 
government expenditure and carbon emissions are obtained, as can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3. Government revenue, government expenditure and carbon emissions
No. t Ri Ei Qi No. t Ri Ei Qi
1 0.4 1.13 3.30 11.765 21 3.4 1.78 4.86 10.445 
2 0.55 0.91 3.31 11.143 22 3.55 1.87 4.99 10.447 
3 0.7 0.81 3.33 10.856 23 3.7 1.96 5.13 10.448 
4 0.85 0.77 3.37 10.702 24 3.85 2.06 5.26 10.450 
5 1 0.76 3.41 10.611 25 4 2.15 5.41 10.451 
6 1.15 0.77 3.46 10.554 26 4.15 2.25 5.55 10.453 
7 1.3 0.80 3.51 10.517 27 4.3 2.34 5.70 10.455 
8 1.45 0.84 3.57 10.492 28 4.45 2.44 5.86 10.457 
9 1.6 0.88 3.64 10.475 29 4.6 2.54 6.01 10.458 
10 1.75 0.94 3.71 10.463 30 4.75 2.64 6.18 10.460 
11 1.9 1.00 3.79 10.455 31 4.9 2.74 6.34 10.462 
12 2.05 1.06 3.88 10.449 32 5.05 2.85 6.51 10.464 
13 2.2 1.13 3.97 10.445 33 5.2 2.95 6.68 10.465 
14 2.35 1.20 4.06 10.443 34 5.35 3.05 6.85 10.467 
15 2.5 1.28 4.16 10.442 35 5.5 3.16 7.03 10.469 
16 2.65 1.36 4.27 10.441 36 5.65 3.26 7.21 10.470 
17 2.8 1.44 4.38 10.441 37 5.8 3.37 7.39 10.472 
18 2.95 1.52 4.49 10.442 38 5.95 3.48 7.58 10.473 
19 3.1 1.61 4.61 10.443 39 6.1 3.59 7.77 10.475 
20 3.25 1.69 4.73 10.444 40 6.25 3.70 7.96 10.476 
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In order to get a more intuitive result, we use Figs. 1-3 to show the relationship 
between the tax rate and the three objectives. As shown in Fig. 1, when the tax rate 
increases, the government revenue decreases rapidly at first, then increases. While in 
Fig. 2, the government expenditure increases quickly. In Fig. 3, the total carbon 
emissions decrease quickly and then increases slowly and smoothly with increasing t. 
Next we use DEA analysis to evaluate each tax rate’s efficiency to select the optimal 
carbon tax rate.
Fig. 1. Government revenue under the carbon tax policy
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Fig. 2. Government expenditure under the carbon tax policy
Fig. 3. Total carbon emissions under the carbon tax policy
Using model (7), we obtain the DEA efficiency scores of all feasible candidates. 
Results show that, policy 40 is the best choice, which leads to highest government 
revenue and government expenditure, while it maintain lower carbon emissions. 
Table 4. DEA efficiency scores of all feasible policies
No. i No. i No. i No. i
1 0.737 11 0.568 21 0.788 31 0.930
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2 0.591 12 0.588 22 0.806 32 0.942
3 0.523 13 0.612 23 0.822 33 0.950
4 0.492 14 0.636 24 0.843 34 0.958
5 0.479 15 0.662 25 0.855 35 0.967
6 0.479 16 0.685 26 0.872 36 0.973
7 0.490 17 0.707 27 0.883 37 0.981
8 0.506 18 0.728 28 0.896 38 0.988
9 0.520 19 0.751 29 0.909 39 0.994
10 0.545 20 0.769 30 0.919 40 1.000
In the next section, we analyze the situation where both of the firms produce 
ordinary products and should pay for carbon tax. Similar to Section 4, we first obtain 
the firms pricing strategies given the government carbon tax rate. Then we analyze 
how the government makes different carbon tax policies for the two firms.  
5. Tax policy on two firms
In this section, we assume that there are two firms in the market and the carbon 
emissions of both of their products exceed the green standard. In other words, both of 
the firms produce ordinary products and need to pay for carbon tax. Next, we derive 
the pricing strategies of the two competing firms and give government optimal carbon 
tax policy considering the government three goals.
5.1 The pricing decisions of the two firms
Similar to Section 4.1, we obtain the demand of product PRO1 as  and * 
demand of product PRO2 as . Then, F1’s optimization problem is given by  
(16)
1 2
1 1 1 1 1,
max   =( )( )(1 ) ( )( )
p p
p c t e e           
Where e is the green standard for both of the products, c1 is F1’s variable cost per unit 
of product and p1 is the selling price.  is the turnover tax rate for each unit of 
product that sells out. The first term represents the net sale profit and the second term 
represents the government carbon tax.
The profit of F2 can be written as follows:
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(17)
1 2
2 2 2 2 2,
max   =( )( )(1 ) ( )( )
p p
p c t e e           
Where c2 is F2’s variable cost per unit of product and p2 is the selling price. 
We obtain the firms optimal selling prices as followers:
(18)
         
 
1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 2
1 2 1 1 2
( , )
3 1
t t kt t t c c t k t
p t t
      

           
(19)
         
 
1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2
2 1 2
2 2 2 1 2 1
( , )
3 1
t t t k t c c t kt t
p t t
      

          
Next, we use a numerical example to analyze the government optimal tax policy 
for each of the firm.
5.2 Determining the optimal tax policies based on centralized DEA
In this section we use a numerical example to illustrate our results. We give some 
of the parameters in Table 5.
Table 5. Parameters setting in the numerical example
c1=0.5 c2=0.8 e=50 =0.3
= 0 1  k=3.5 α=1.5
1=4 2=2
The government may use different tax policies for the two firms respectively. 
Here we let tax rate t1 be 0.1, 0.2 … 1.0 with common difference of 0.1, and let t2 be 
0.2, 0.4 … 2.0 with common difference of 0.2. There are 100 tax portfolios of t1 and 
t2. Eliminating the results that cannot meet the condition, we get 95 feasible choices 
on each firm’s tax rates, as can be shown in the first column of Table 6. Table 6 also 
shows the corresponding government revenue, government expenditure and carbon 
emissions to each t1 and t2. 
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Table 6. Government revenue, government expenditure and carbon emissions
No. t1 t2 Ri Ei Qi No. t1 t2 Ri Ei Qi
1 0.1 0.2 24.86 2.63 111.54 49 0.6 0.2 4.20 2.56 80.27 
2 0.1 0.4 27.02 2.61 93.58 50 0.6 0.4 6.36 2.48 62.32 
3 0.1 0.6 27.15 2.61 88.90 51 0.6 0.8 6.30 2.52 55.58 
4 0.1 0.8 27.03 2.60 86.85 52 0.6 1 6.12 2.48 54.46 
5 0.1 1 26.88 2.60 85.72 53 0.6 1.2 5.94 2.45 53.76 
6 0.1 1.2 26.74 2.60 85.02 54 0.6 1.4 5.78 2.43 53.28 
7 0.1 1.4 26.61 2.60 84.54 55 0.6 1.6 5.64 2.41 52.93 
8 0.1 1.6 26.50 2.60 84.19 56 0.6 1.8 5.51 2.40 52.67 
9 0.1 1.8 26.40 2.59 83.93 57 0.6 2 5.40 2.39 52.46 
10 0.1 2 26.31 2.59 83.73 58 0.7 0.2 3.78 2.56 79.91 
11 0.2 0.4 13.31 2.59 71.28 59 0.7 0.4 5.94 2.48 61.96 
12 0.2 0.6 13.41 2.57 66.59 60 0.7 0.6 6.04 2.33 57.27 
13 0.2 0.8 13.28 2.56 64.54 61 0.7 0.8 5.90 2.61 55.22 
14 0.2 1 13.12 2.56 63.42 62 0.7 1 5.71 2.48 54.10 
15 0.2 1.2 12.96 2.55 62.71 63 0.7 1.2 5.53 2.44 53.40 
16 0.2 1.4 12.82 2.55 62.23 64 0.7 1.4 5.37 2.42 52.92 
17 0.2 1.6 12.70 2.54 61.89 65 0.7 1.6 5.22 2.40 52.57 
18 0.2 1.8 12.59 2.54 61.63 66 0.7 1.8 5.09 2.38 52.31 
19 0.2 2 12.49 2.54 61.42 67 0.7 2 4.98 2.37 52.10 
20 0.3 0.2 7.44 2.58 83.97 68 0.8 0.2 3.47 2.55 79.68 
21 0.3 0.4 9.58 2.58 66.02 69 0.8 0.4 5.64 2.47 61.73 
22 0.3 0.6 9.67 2.55 61.33 70 0.8 0.6 5.74 2.37 57.04 
23 0.3 0.8 9.53 2.54 59.28 71 0.8 1 5.41 2.53 53.87 
24 0.3 1 9.36 2.52 58.16 72 0.8 1.2 5.23 2.45 53.16 
25 0.3 1.2 9.19 2.51 57.45 73 0.8 1.4 5.07 2.41 52.68 
26 0.3 1.4 9.05 2.51 56.97 74 0.8 1.6 4.92 2.38 52.34 
27 0.3 1.6 8.92 2.50 56.63 75 0.8 1.8 4.79 2.36 52.08 
28 0.3 1.8 8.80 2.50 56.37 76 0.8 2 4.67 2.35 51.87 
29 0.3 2 8.70 2.49 56.16 77 0.9 0.2 3.23 2.55 79.52 
30 0.4 0.2 5.76 2.57 81.89 78 0.9 0.4 5.41 2.47 61.57 
31 0.4 0.6 7.99 2.54 59.25 79 0.9 0.6 5.52 2.38 56.88 
32 0.4 0.8 7.84 2.52 57.20 80 0.9 0.8 5.36 2.15 54.83 
33 0.4 1 7.66 2.50 56.08 81 0.9 1 5.19 2.70 53.71 
34 0.4 1.2 7.49 2.49 55.37 82 0.9 1.2 5.01 2.48 53.01 
35 0.4 1.4 7.34 2.47 54.89 83 0.9 1.4 4.84 2.42 52.53 
36 0.4 1.6 7.21 2.47 54.55 84 0.9 1.6 4.70 2.38 52.18 
37 0.4 1.8 7.09 2.46 54.28 85 0.9 1.8 4.56 2.35 51.92 
38 0.4 2 6.98 2.45 54.08 86 0.9 2 4.44 2.33 51.71 
39 0.5 0.2 4.81 2.57 80.86 87 1 0.2 3.05 2.55 79.41 
40 0.5 0.4 6.95 2.47 62.90 88 1 0.4 5.24 2.46 61.46 
41 0.5 0.6 7.05 2.58 58.22 89 1 0.6 5.34 2.38 56.77 
42 0.5 0.8 6.90 2.51 56.17 90 1 0.8 5.19 2.24 54.72 
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43 0.5 1 6.72 2.48 55.04 91 1 1.2 4.84 2.56 52.90 
44 0.5 1.2 6.54 2.46 54.34 92 1 1.4 4.67 2.44 52.42 
45 0.5 1.4 6.39 2.45 53.86 93 1 1.6 4.52 2.39 52.07 
46 0.5 1.6 6.25 2.44 53.51 94 1 1.8 4.39 2.35 51.81 
47 0.5 1.8 6.12 2.43 53.25 95 1 2 4.27 2.32 51.60 
48 0.5 2 6.01 2.42 53.05 
Figs 4-6 present the impact of government different carbon tax policies on each 
of the three goals. Different form the figures in Section 4, we use three-dimensional 
graphs to show how the tax portfolios of t1 and t2 impact the government multiple 
objectives. In Fig. 4, we find that in most cases, the government revenue may increase 
with increasing t2 while decrease with increasing t1. However, in case 11-13, or 63-66, 
the government revenue would decrease in t2. It is difficult to find a best carbon tax 
policy from the three figures. Therefore, in what followers, we use DEA to evaluate 
the efficiency of each tax portfolio of t1 and t2 and select the optimal carbon tax 
portfolio for the government.
Fig. 4. Government revenue under different carbon tax policies
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Fig. 5. Government expenditure under different carbon tax policies
Fig. 6. Total carbon emissions under different carbon tax policies
Using model (5)-(7), we obtain the DEA efficiency scores of all feasible policies 
respectively in Table 7. 
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Table 7. DEA efficiency scores of all feasible policies
No. i No. i No. i No. i
1 0.909 25 0.508 49 0.166 73 0.306
2 0.995 26 0.505 50 0.324 74 0.299
3 1.000 27 0.500 51 0.360 75 0.292
4 1.000 28 0.496 52 0.357 76 0.286
5 1.000 29 0.492 53 0.351 77 0.129
6 1.000 30 0.223 54 0.345 78 0.279
7 1.000 31 0.428 55 0.339 79 0.308
8 1.000 32 0.435 56 0.332 80 0.311
9 0.999 33 0.434 57 0.327 81 0.307
10 0.998 34 0.430 58 0.150 82 0.300
11 0.593 35 0.425 59 0.305 83 0.293
12 0.640 36 0.420 60 0.335 84 0.286
13 0.654 37 0.415 61 0.339 85 0.279
14 0.657 38 0.410 62 0.335 86 0.273
15 0.657 39 0.189 63 0.329 87 0.122
16 0.654 40 0.351 64 0.322 88 0.271
17 0.652 41 0.385 65 0.315 89 0.299
18 0.649 42 0.390 66 0.309 90 0.301
19 0.646 43 0.388 67 0.304 91 0.291
20 0.282 44 0.382 68 0.138 92 0.283
21 0.461 45 0.377 69 0.290 93 0.276
22 0.501 46 0.371 70 0.320 94 0.269
23 0.511 47 0.365 71 0.319 95 0.263
24 0.511 48 0.360 72 0.313
Table 7 shows the DEA efficiency scores of all 95 feasible policies. It can be 
found that policy 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 may all be good choices for the government. 
Furthermore, much different from the tax policy for one firm that highest tax rate 
would be chosen, the government would use the strategy to set relatively lower tax 
rate for one firm and higher tax rate for the other to achieve a comprehensive effect.
6. Conclusions
Policy makers always operate with multiple goals, and a given tax policy may 
benefit some goals while hinder the others. In this paper, we examine the role the 
carbon tax policy plays in reducing carbon emissions, increasing government revenue 
and decreasing government expenditure. In order to select the optimal carbon tax rate 
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that can achieve a comprehensive effect, we regard the problem as multiple criteria 
decision making problem and use an evaluating method based on centralized DEA 
approach to solve the problem. 
The contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows: we consider 
multiple goals of a government when making environmental policy decision. In most 
literature that discuss the government environmental policy, like pollution tax (Krass 
et al. 2013), green subsidy (Huang et al. 2013, Cohen et al. 2015) and cap-and-trade 
regulation (Xu et al. 2016), they assume that the government makes policy strategies 
only considering one goal, i.e., maximize the social warfare or minimize the carbon 
emissions. While in this paper, we consider government revenue, government 
expenditure and carbon emissions, and use centralized DEA method to find a most 
suitable tax rate to achieve comprehensive benefit of the three goals.
Then, we present a three-step decision framework to determine the optimal 
carbon tax rate for the government. In the first step, we analyze the firms’ pricing 
strategies assuming that the tax rate is given. In the second step, we identify the 
government three goals and deduce the qualitative estimations to help us understand 
the conflicts among the three goals. In the last step, we regard the problem as multiple 
criteria decision making problem and use centralized DEA approach to obtain the 
optimal carbon tax rate. We use a game-based method to probe into the competition 
between the ordinary products and the green products, and an equilibrium point is 
obtained to determine the optimal decisions of the two firms on how to price the 
products for the maximal profit. 
Furthermore, we consider two different cases in this paper. In the first case, we 
focus on the government carbon tax policy for one firm. We find that the government 
may set a high tax rate. While in the second case, we expend the current model to 
focus on the government different policies for two firms. We find that the government 
would use the strategy to set relatively lower tax rate for one firm and higher tax rate 
for the other to achieve a comprehensive effect. 
We suggest that three possible extensions to our current work are worth 
investigation. First, some other assumptions e.g. stochastic market demand, multiple 
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companies and multiple types of customers can be considered. Second, the qualitative 
technique on estimating the values of the three goals can be improved. Third, some 
other emissions policies e.g. cap-and-trade, mandatory carbon emissions capacity and 
carbon offsets are meaningful topics for further consideration.
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